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I.

Introduction

Since the classic paper by Friedman and Savage (1948), it has generally been accepted that the observed fact that individuals or firmsl
participate in unfair lotteries and other forms of unfair risk taking 2
may be explained by a section in the individual's utility function in
which the individual shows risk preference rather than risk aversion.
In their model, Friedman and Savage specify a utility function which
is, in turn, concave, convex, and concave, thus allowing for simultaneous purchase of insurance (risk aversion) and participation in lotteries
(risk preference).
However, while their specified utility function is indeed capable of
explaining observed behavior, it does seem to be rather unsatisfactory
in that it is an ad hoc specification. It is the purpose of this paper to
suggest a set of circumstances which give rise to a FriedmanSavage-type utility function.
In particular, it is shown that when certain capital market imperfections exist the utility function defined over intermediate wealth
should be distinguished from and may have different properties than
the one defined on final wealth. Then, even if we accept the common
assumption made in the literature that individuals are risk averse, that
is, that their utility function is concave over final wealth, it is still
possible that they participate in unfair gambling (and, of course, may
also purchase insurance).
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the European Meeting of the
Econometric Society, Athens, September 1979. We wish to thank the editor and an
anonymous referee for their helpful comments.
1 The word "individual" is, throughout this paper, used to denote economic units,
including both individuals and firms.
• The term "unfair lottery" in the paper encompasses all investment opportunities
offering actuarially unfair risks.
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The motivation behind our endeavor to provide an institutional
explanation for gambling is a reluctance (shown, e.g., by Stigler and
Becker [1977]) to use non-well-behaved utility functions as explanations for economic phenomena without some a priori reasons for
assuming that the utility function is of an unusual shape. Clearly all
phenomena in economics can be technically explained by recourse to
tastes. Thus, for example, individuals will necessarily show risk preference over a section of their utility function which is assumed convex. However, is there any a priori reason to assume that there may be
such a section? It is a positive answer to this question which this paper
attempts to provide.
In Section II we discuss certain capital market imperfections and
their implications about the nature of rates of return on investment.
In Section III we show how the Friedman-Savage utility function may
emerge when utility is defined on intermediate wealth and there exist
capital market imperfections. The possibility of gambling with risk
aversion and of simultaneous gambling and insurance therefore immediately arises.

II.

Rates of Return and Capital Market Imperfections

A number of recent studies discuss the effects of uncertainty, imperfect information, and various transaction costs on capital markets
and show that the result may be that capital markets are characterized
by certain imperfections. These imperfections are usually in terms of
the nonexistence of certain markets and the fact that there may not be
free and equal access to other markets. Uncertainty and the possibility
of costly default may lead lenders to introduce collateral requirements
or take default costs into account in their loan rates. Consequently, it
can be said that one has to have certain assets (providing collateral
services) in order to have easier or cheaper access to capital markets.
Barro (1976) and Benjamin (1978) derive these conclusions explicitly and show that market imperfections will lead to loan rates
being functions of loan sizes and available collateral. In particular,
they derive a loan-supply function which is constant for some initial
range and then becomes an increasing and convex function of loan
sizes.
In the same vein, Jaffee and Modigliani (1969) show that, as a result
of uncertainty and imperfect and costly information, capital markets
may be characterized by credit rationing. They show that beyond a
certain point loan rates will generally depend on loan sizes, with a
possible upper bound on loan sizes. Furthermore, they provide
empirical evidence supporting these types of imperfections.
Empirical evidence indicating capital market imperfections is also
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given by Eckstein (1961) and Nerlove (1968), who find capital markets
to be characterized by differential rates of return on given investments.
The important implication of the capital market imperfections is
that individuals face a variety of capital market constraints and, therefore, do not have free and equal access to the market. Consequently,
capital provides additional services by either weakening the accessibility constraints or by reducing the cost of the acquisition of capital.
By providing collateral services, capital, therefore, increases the set of
"feasible activities" or reduces their cost, so that its "full rate of
return" should take this additional role into account.
A consequence of these capital market imperfections is that for
some levels of asset holdings the rates of return on assets may depend
on the levels of the asset holdings, even from an individual's (rather
than an aggregate) point of view. The range within which this is likely
to happen is when wealth levels are low, but not below some minimum
level. When an individual's wealth is below some minimum level the
capital market constraints may be so effective that except for the
possibility of obtaining small loans the market is in effect inaccessible.
Since small loans can usually be obtained at constant loan rates (as is
shown in Jaffee and Modigliani [1969], Barro [1976], and Benjamin
[1978), the additional role of asset holding is ineffective within this
initial range, and consequently the rates of return will not depend on
asset holdings. However, as an individual's asset holdings increase
above some minimum level, his higher level of wealth will provide him
with the additional "collateral services," and rates of return within this
range will depend on the levels of wealth.
Since rates of return are usually not known with certainty, the
dependence of rates of return on asset holdings is in a probabilistic
sense. In other words, the rates-of-return probability distribution
function changes with asset holdings, that is, the distribution is conditional on asset holdings. 3
In addition to the above considerations, rates of return may be
increasing functions of wealth (over some initial range) for other
reasons as well. First, a large number of fixed costs may be incurred in
effecting profitable investment. Information costs incurred in locating high-return investments may be considerable, and a large element
of these costs may be relatively fixed. Transaction costs, where again
the large part is fixed, are also likely to comprise a high percentage of
small investments. In the presence of these costs the rate of return will
be an increasing function of the investment. Second, there may exist
3 Thus, e.g., an increase in asset holdings will over some range make the probability
distribution more stochastically dominant.
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significant indivisibilities which (especially in view of the capital market constraints) will imply increasing returns to scale.
In view of these considerations, we conclude that individuals, especially those with small or moderate levels of wealth, may very often
face various capital market constraints which lead to rates of return
being functions of wealth. Furthermore, the relationship between
wealth and the rates of return is such that rates of return are (at least
over some range) increasing functions of wealth.
III.

Gambling with Risk A version

Having discussed some of the capital market imperfections and the
constraints they impose on individuals, we now consider their effects
on the individual's attitudes toward risk taking.
In order to focus on the gambling problem and to separate it from
the investment problem, we assume that the rate of return is nonrandom. This assumption is not crucial and does not change the results.
For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that there is only one asset.
A discussion of the case with many assets and random rates of return
can be found in Appelbaum and Katz (1979), where the same results
are derived.
In line with the discussion in the previous section, it will be assumed
that the individual faces a rate of return R on his investment, A, such
that
R'
R

= R(A)

o

for A * :s:; A :s:; A **

R' > 0

R'

O:S:; A :s:; A*

o

for

(1)

A > A**,

where R' is the partial derivative of R. In other words, the rate of
return is constant over some initial range, increasing over some subsequent range,4 and then constant again.
An individual investing an amount A will end up with final wealth
W, such that
W

= A[l + R(A)].

(2)

Clearly, convexity of R(A) over some range is sufficient, but not
necessary, for the convexity ofW(A) over the same range; both convex
and concave rate-of-return functions may lead to a convex W(A).s
• This type ofreturn function is diScussed also in Blinder (1974) and Appelbaum and
Harris (1978).
• It does, however, seem reasonable that at least over some initial range (when R is not
constant) R" > 0, i.e., the function is convex. The convexity of R(A) at the initial range
would, e.g., follow from the convexity of the loan-supply function derived by Jaffee and
Modigliani (1969), Barro (1976), and Be~amin (1978).
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Let us now consider the individual's decision problem. Following
the literature ,6 we assume the individual has a utility function defined
on final wealth, U(W), and that
U' > 0,

U" < 0;

(3)

that is, the individual is risk averse.
Now, consider the individual's utility function when it is defined
over A -his intermediate wealth. This is given by
V(A)

= U{A[l + R(A)]}

(4)

+

(5)

and
V'(A)
V"(A)

= U"

. (1

=

U' . (1

+

R

R

+

AR'),

+ AR'? + u' .

(W'

+

AR").

(6)

Therefore, in accordance with our above discussion, V' > 0 for all
values of A. For A < A* and A > A**, V" is clearly negative. Within the
range A * < A :s A ** the second term on the right-hand side of (6) may
be positive and, hence, V" may be positive. If this occurs there will be a
section of V(A) that will be convex and, hence, V will show the
Friedman-Savage shape of being in turn concave, convex, and concave.
The result may also be derived diagrammatically, as is shown in
figure 1. The curve V(A) drawn in the first quadrant is clearly a
Friedman-Savage type of utility function which allows both gambling
and insurance in intermediate wealth to take place simultaneously.
Even if V(A) is concave within the range A * < A < A **, we can still
get a convex region, as in the Friedman-Savage utility function, since
V(A) will, in general, have a kink at A*. Thus, although in this case
V(A) is made of concave segments only, it will nevertheless not be
globally concave. This case is shown in figure 2, where again it is
possible to observe gambling and insurance simultaneously.
Hence, we have provided an explanation of the shape of the
Friedman-Savage utility function without suggesting that an individual is anything but everywhere risk averse. Rather than focus on
the tastes of the individual, we have focused on his institutional
constraints. 7
See, e.g., Anow 1970.
An alternative way of obtaining these results is to employ the state preference
approach and consider the effects of capital market imperfections on the set of acceptable gambles. It can be easily shown (see Appelbaum and Katz 1979) that the isoutility
curves defined over two random states are not necessarily convex, and thus both
gambling and insurance buying may occur simultaneously.
8
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Conclusion

This paper provides a possible rationale for the Friedman-Savage
utility function. It suggests that the existence of market imperfections,
in particular in the capital markets, may impose various constraints on
individuals and thus affect their behavior. The existence of these
constraints could lead individuals to participate in unfair gambling,
since this may reduce the implicit costs of the constraints.

COMMENTS

Our explanation of gambling focuses on the constraints facing an
individual rather than on his preferences, and consequently it does
not require a modification of the standard assumption that individuals are risk averse. Of course, it may be that individuals show risk
preference over a section of their utility function. Such a section is
not, however, necessary in order to derive a Friedman-Savage type of
utility function.
References
Appelbaum, Elie, and Harris, Richard C. "Imperfect Capital Markets and
Life-Cycle Saving." Canadian]. Econ. 11 (May 1978): 319-24.
Appelbaum, Elie, and Katz, Eliakim. "Imperfect Capital Markets and
Gambling with Risk Aversion." Discussion Paper no. 7912, Univ. Western
Ontario, May 1979.
Arrow, Kenneth J. Essays in the Theory of Risk-bearing. Chicago: Markham,
1970.
Barro, Robert J. "The Loan Market, Collateral, and Rates of Interest." ].
Money, Credit and Banking 8 (November 1976): 439-56.
Benjamin, Daniel K. "The Use of Collateral to Enforce Debt Contracts." Econ.
Inquiry 16 (July 1978): 333-59.
Blinder, Alan S. Toward an Economic Theory of Income Dzstribution. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1974.
Eckstein, Otto. "A Survey of the Theory of Public Expenditure Criteria:
Reply." In Conference of the Universities-National Bureau Committee for
Economic Research, Public Finances: Needs, Sources, and UtiliUltion. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961.
Friedman, Milton, and Savage, Leonard J. "The Utility Analysis of Choices
Involving Risk." ].P.E. 56, no. 4 (August 1948): 279-304.
Jaffee, Dwight M., and Modigliani, Franco. "A Theory and Test of Credit
Rationing." A.E.R. 59 (December 1969): 850-72.
Nerlove, Marc. "Factors Affecting Differences among Rates of Return on
Investments in Individual Common Stocks." Rev. Econ. and Statis. 50 (August 1968): 312-31.
Stigler, George j., and Becker, Gary S. "De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum."
A.E.R. 67 (March 1977): 76-90.

